Desires, Right and Wrong
- Michael Connolly
- Sep 20
- 2 min read
Desires, Right and Wrong: The Ethics of Enough by Mortimer J. Adler, Macmillan, 1991.
This book describes one part of the ethical philosophy of Aristotle. According to Aristotle, moral virtue means desiring what is good for oneself. To be moral means to engage in healthy self-love, rather than self-destructive habits. Also, to be moral is more about good intentions than good actions
Unlike the Buddhists and Immanuel Kant, Aristotle and Adler do not see desire as being evil. Instead, they make a finer distinction: it is not desire in and of itself that is wrong, but rather only wrong desire, desire for those things that harm us. For example, it is wrong to desire fame and power. Honor, not fame, however, is a good thing to desire.
The subtitle of the book, “The Ethics of Enough”, means that we should desire only as much as is good for us, and not more. This is similar to the point that Adler has made elsewhere that there are two kinds of goods: limited goods and unlimited goods. Food is a limited good, because eating too much is bad for us. Knowledge is an unlimited good, because we can never know too much. It is good to desire money, provided not excessively. Sensual desire (food, drink, sex, play) is good, provided: (a) it is desired only in moderation, (b) it is not the primary desire, © it does not harm ones other interests, (d) it does not harm others.
There are four moral virtues: (a) Courage, (b) Temperance, © Prudence (practical wisdom, choosing the right means), (d) Justice.
The primary goal of right desire is achieving a well-lived life. The four moral virtues work together and reinforce each other, in order to achieve this objective.
The Biblical Ten Commandments of Judaism concern themselves mainly with wrong action. The seven cardinal sins of Christianity concern themselves mainly with wrong desire. Adler favors judging the individual primarily by his or her soul, heart, intentions, and desires, rather than on his or her actions.
The individual is not morally obligated to help strangers directly, but it is moral for the individual to promote a just society, which will benefit strangers indirectly.
Adler argues that there is not only descriptive knowledge, knowledge about what does or does not exist, but also prescriptive knowledge, where prescriptive means assertions regarding which goals should be desired. Prescriptive knowledge is not mere opinion. Prescriptive knowledge is objective, transcultural and universal. Adler opposes the assertion that all moral judgements are ethnocentric.
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